Peter Winch’s philosophy of religion is controversial, accused of mere “perspectivism” and fideism, and for avoiding discussion of any existential reference for the object of belief. This essay examines what Winch meant by a “perspective.” It first deals with problems of first-person propositions of belief. For Wittgenstein and Winch belief, and the fact it believes, are inextricably bound together. Thus Winch argues that what is said cannot be divorced from the situation of the sayer; understanding requires making shifts in perspective. Finally, I compare Winch’s use of religious language to Augustine’s doctrine of the “inner word,” arguing that there are important parallels in Winch to pre-Lockean theological understandings of faith.
Philosophical Investigations, vol. 27, no. 4 (Oct. 2004) pp. 345-369.
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