La personne et le sacré: collectivité, personne, impersonnel, droit, justice
H-France Review, vol. 20, no. 143, pp. 1-5.
H-France Review, vol. 20, no. 143, pp. 1-5.
in Charlotte Alston, Amber Carpenter & Rachael Wiseman, eds., Portraits of Integrity: 26 Case Studies from History, Literature, and Philosophy, Bloomsbury Academic, 2020, pp. 141-149.
D.K. Levy is a moral philosopher working in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.
Philosophers have long debated the subjects of person and personhood. Sharon Cameron ushers this debate into the literary realm by considering impersonality in the works of major American writers and figures of international modernism—writers for whom personal identity is inconsequential and even imaginary. In essays on William Empson, Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Herman Melville, T. S. Eliot, and Simone Weil, Cameron examines the impulse to hollow out the core of human distinctiveness, to construct a voice that is no one’s voice, to fashion a character without meaningful attributes, a being that is virtually anonymous.
“To consent to being anonymous,” Weil wrote, “is to bear witness to the truth. But how is this compatible with social life and its labels?” Throughout these essays Cameron examines the friction, even violence, set in motion from such incompatibility—from a “truth” that has no social foundation. Impersonality investigates the uncompromising nature of writing that suspends, eclipses, and even destroys the person as a social, political, or individual entity, of writing that engages with personal identity at the moment when its usual markers vanish or dissolve.
in Cameron, Impersonality: Seven Essays, Chicago: University of Chicago press, 2007, p. 108-143. Previously published: “The Practice of Attention: Simone Weil’s Performance of Impersonality,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 29 (Winter 2003), pp. 216-252
The European Journal of Women’s Studies, Vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 183-200